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Abstract. This paper studies multi-agent systems that involve networks
of self-interested agents. We propose a Markov Decision Process-derived
framework, called RepNet-MDP, tailored to domains in which agent rep-
utation is a key driver of the interactions between agents. The funda-
mentals are based on the principles of RepNet-POMDP, a framework
developed by Rens et al. [11] in 2018, but addresses its mathematical
inconsistencies and alleviates its intractability by only considering fully
observable environments. We furthermore use an online learning algo-
rithm for finding approximate solutions to RepNet-MDPs. In a series of
experiments, RepNet agents are shown to be able to adapt their own
behavior to the past behavior and reliability of the remaining agents of
the network. Finally, our work identifies a limitation of the framework
in its current formulation that prevents its agents from learning in cir-
cumstances in which they are not a primary actor.
Keywords: Uncertainty · Planning · Reputation · MDP · POMDP.
1 Introduction
Decision-making and learning in multi-agent settings is a multi-faceted area
of research [4,2,3,14,7,6,1]. Frameworks used for fully cooperative networks of
agents differ vastly from those used for networks of self-interested agents. A
primary concern when dealing with self-centered agents is that it makes multi-
agent learning inherently more complex than single-agent learning [6,1]. In fact,
each agent needs to take into account the behavior of the entire network of
agents when learning its own behavior. Additionally, agent behavior tends to be
ever-changing. This non-stationarity of agent behavior leads to the loss of policy
convergence properties that can often be found in single-agent formalisms [1].
In 2018, Rens et al. [11] proposed a mathematical framework, called RepNet-
POMDP, designed to handle partially observable environments in which an
agent’s reputation among other agents dictates its behavior. The framework was
subject to several mathematical inconsistencies, had no working implementation,
and had a highly intractable planning algorithm.
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Nonetheless, the framework does present some ideas we believe are worth
pursuing. Hence, in this paper, we provide an updated version of the frame-
work, called RepNet-MDP. We address the mathematical inconsistencies of the
original framework and alleviate its intractability by only considering fully ob-
servable environments. We furthermore make use of an online learning algorithm
for finding approximate solutions to RepNet-MDPs. The viability of the frame-
work is tested in a series of experiments designed to highlight its strengths and
shortcomings.
Section 2 summarizes the relevant background required. Section 3 gives an
overview of the work related to our framework. Section 4 provides an intuitive
introduction to RepNet-MDPs. Section 5 covers the formal definition of the
framework. Section 6 covers planning for RepNet-MDPs. The experimental setup
and results are given in Section 7.
2 Background - Markov Decision Processes
A Markov Decision Process (MDP) describes a process for modeling decision-
making in stochastic environments [13]. An agent is assumed to move about
in an environment, described by a set of states S, by applying actions in A
to the environment. The transition rules of the environment are dictated by the
transition model T : S×A×S → [0, 1], that is, T (s, a, s′) returns the probability
of the agent transitioning to state s′ upon performing action a in state s. Each
action applied to the environment results in a reward for the agent, dictated by
the reward function R : S ×A → R, that is, R(s, a) returns the reward received
by the agent when performing action a in state s.
The objective of an MDP agent is to maximize its long-term cumulative
reward, called utility. The utility U of a finite state-action sequence, sometimes
called episode, E =
〈
s0, a0, s1, a1, ..., sT , aT
〉
is defined as [10]:
U(E) =
T∑
t=0
γtR(st, at),
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is called the discount factor. An agent advances in the environ-
ment by following a policy pi : S × N → A that maps each environment state
and remaining time-steps to the action the agent should take.
The expected utility, or value, of being in any state st at time-step t, while
following policy pi, with d time-steps remaining, is defined as:
V pi(st, d) = E[U(Et) | st, pi] = E
[ t+d∑
k=t
γk−tR(sk, ak)
∣∣ st, pi],
where Et is the sub-sequence of E starting at time-step t. An optimal policy pi
?
is a policy such that
∀s ∈ S,∀d ∈ N,∀pi : V ?(s, d) ≥ V pi(s, d),
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where V ? : S × N → R is the value function associated with optimal policy
pi?. This policy satisfies the optimality equations, also known as the Bellman
equations (∀s ∈ S):
V ?(s, d) := max
a∈A
{
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s, a, s′)V ?(s′, d− 1)
}
d > 1
V ?(s, 1) := max
a∈A
{
R(s, a)
}
Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes are a common extension of
classic MDPs that deal with the problem of partial observability of the envi-
ronment [13]. To address the agent’s inability to observe the exact state of the
environment, the observation function O : A × S × Ω → [0, 1], where Ω is the
set of observations, is introduced. O(a, s′, o) returns the probability of the agent
making observation o after performing action a and the environment transition-
ing to state s′.
Instead of working with the actual states of the environment, the POMDP
agents make use of the notion of belief state b ∈ ∆(S) 3, which is a probability
distribution over the possible states of the environment. As such, b(s) returns
the probability of being in state s. Furthermore,∑
s∈S
b(s) = 1.
Suppose the agent makes observation o after taking action a in current be-
lief state b. The updated belief state b′ is computed using the state estimation
function SE defined as follows:
b′ := SE(b, a, o) :=
{
(s′, p)
∣∣∣ s′ ∈ S ∧ p = O(a, s′, o)∑s T (s, a, s′)b(s)
P (o|b, a)
}
,
where P (o|b, a) = ∑s′∈S O(a, s′, o)∑s∈S T (s, a, s′)b(s) is a normalizing con-
stant. The optimal value function V ? : ∆(S) × N → R satisfies the following
optimality equations (∀b ∈ ∆(S)):

V ?(b, d) := max
a∈A
{∑
s∈S
R(s, a)b(s) + γ
∑
o∈Ω
P (o|b, a)V ?(SE(b, a, o), d− 1)
}
V ?(b, 1) := max
a∈A
{∑
s∈S
R(s, a)b(s)
}
We refer to [13] for an extensive overview of POMDPs.
3 Related MDP-based frameworks
Early multi-agent frameworks, such as Multi-agent Markov Decision Processes
(MMDPs) [4] and Decentralized Partially Observable MDPs (Dec-POMDPs)
3 ∆(E) is the set of probability distributions over the elements of set E .
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[2,3], operate under the assumption that the agents are selfless and have a com-
mon goal. Consequently, planning can be centralized, that is, each agent’s policy
can be computed by central unit, before being distributed amid the agents for
execution [14]. Dec-POMDPs furthermore differ from MMDPs in that states are
no longer fully observable, meaning that each agent is in possession of its own
set of local observations.
In 2005, Gmytrasiewicz et al. formalized an extension of POMDPs to multi-
agent settings, called Interactive-POMDP (I-POMDP) [7]. I-POMDPs are de-
signed for reasoning in networks of selfish agents. I-POMDP agents update their
beliefs not only over physical states of the environment but also over models of
the other agents in the network. The difficulty of solving I-POMDPs lies in the
recursive nature of the models. Consider agent g’s belief update in a network
inhabited by another agent, say h. A model of agent h may consist of the be-
lief function of said agent h over physical states and models of all other agents.
These models may, in turn, consist of belief functions of their own. This nesting
of beliefs could theoretically be infinite, but is overcome by bounding the nesting
depth by a finite number n, and solving the problem as a set of POMDPs.
The RepNet-MDP framework [11] simplifies the notion of model by focusing
in on key concepts such as behavioral habits and reputation of other agents.
While this reduces the insights RepNet agents can have into other agents’ be-
havior, it makes the framework arguably more intuitive. The key, novel notion in
the RepNet framework is that of subjective transitions, which have a dependence
on the reputation of the agent performing the action.
4 Developing an intuition for RepNet-MDPs
To develop an intuition for the RepNet-MDP framework, parallels between the
concepts found in classic POMDPs and RepNet-MDPs can be drawn. In a
POMDP, a single agent, placed in a partially observable environment, applies
an action a? it deems optimal as per its current policy pi?, and is sent back an
observation o. The state estimation function SE can be thought of as a way of
extracting information from said observation o, and storing it in a belief state
b′. More specifically, o contains information about the actual state of the envi-
ronment. The POMDP loop is depicted in Fig. 1a.
Let us now consider a fully observable environment made up of 3 selfish
agents, of which the behavior of the first is dictated by the RepNet-MDP frame-
work. The willingness of the RepNet agent to engage with agents 2 or 3 is to
be conditioned by their reputation and behavioral habits. The first agent once
again applies action a?, as per its policy pi?. The environment returns its new
state s′. In an effort to make well-informed decisions, the RepNet agent should
extract the other agents’ behavior from s′.
Two functions, analogous to the state estimation function SE in POMDPs,
are used to this end: The action distribution estimation function ADE extracts
information regarding other agents’ behavioral habits. The image estimation
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Environment
SE pi?
b′ a?
o
(a) The POMDP loop
Environment
ADE pi?
AD′ a?
s′
IE Img′
(b) The RepNet-MDP loop
Fig. 1: POMDP and RepNet-MDP loops.
function IE informs the RepNet agent on the image all the agents have of each
other. The RepNet-MDP loop is shown in Fig. 1b.
Closely tied to the concept of image is the notion of reputation. Specifically,
the reputation of any agent in the framework can be seen as a summary of the
information encapsulated by the image. Unlike POMDPs, RepNet-MDPs feature
two types of actions, and by extention two types of transition models:
– Objective actions, which, when performed, have a real effect on the envi-
ronment. These actions can be seen as equivalent to actions as they exist
in MDPs. The associated transition model is called the objective transition
model OT and describes the rules of the environment as they apply to the
RepNet agent.
– Subjective actions, which, unlike objective actions, are never actually ap-
plied to the environment. Instead, they are associated with another transi-
tion model called the subjective transition model ST : This transition model
describes a RepNet agent’s subjective perception of the rules of the environ-
ment. This perception is a function of said agent’s reputation, and can be
used by the agent to aid in its decision-making.
5 Formal definition of RepNet-MDPs
In this section, we will formalize the RepNet-MDP framework introduced in
Section 4. A RepNet-MDP M is defined as a pair of tuples
M := 〈Σ,Γ〉,
where Σ is called the System tuple and incorporates aspects of the network that
apply to all agents, and Γ is called the Agents tuple and contains each agent’s
subjective understanding of the environment it operates in.
Specifically, a System in a RepNet-MDP Σ is formally defined as a tuple
Σ :=
〈G,S,A, I,U〉,
6 D. Maoujoud and G. Rens
where:
– G is the set of agents that can interact with the environment.
– S is the set of possible states of the environment.
– A is the set of possible actions, both objective and subjective. Formally,
A := Ao ∪ As Ao ∩ As := ∅.
The concept of subjective actions will be discussed in Section 5.2.
– I : G×G×S×A → [−1, 1] is called the impact function. I(g, h, s, a) returns
the impact on agent g that is due to agent h performing action a in state s.
This function can be thought of as analogous to a Markov Decision Process’s
immediate reward function R.
– U : [−1, 1] × [−1, 1] → [−1, 1] is called the image update function. Given a
current value v, of the image on agent has of another agent, to be updated,
and a new expected total impact i, of which the definition will be given
shortly, U(v, i) returns an updated value of the image v′. Many instantiations
of this function are possible, two of which are presented in [11]. We will use
the following instantiation:
U(v, i) :=
{
v + (1− v)i if i ≥ 0
v + (1 + v)i if i < 0
In addition to the global information stored in Σ, each RepNet agent’s sub-
jective knowledge is stored in the Agents tuple Γ , formally defined as
Γ :=
〈{UTg}, {DTg}, {ADg}, {Imgg}〉, 4
where:
– OT : G × S × Ao × S → [0, 1] is called the objective transition model.
OT (h, s, a, s′) returns the probability of the environment transitioning from
state s to state s′ when objective action a is taken by agent h.
– STg : G × S × As × S × [−1, 1] → [0, 1] is called the subjective transition
model of agent g. STg(h, s, a, rh, s
′) returns the probability, as perceived by
agent g, of the environment transitioning from state s to state s′ if agent h
were to perform subjective action a, and has a reputation rh according to
agent g.
– ADg : G × S → ∆(A) is called the action distribution according to agent g.
ADg(h, s) returns a probability distribution over actions in A for agent h in
state s, according to agent g.
– Imgg : G × G → [−1, 1] is called the image function according to agent g.
Imgg(h, i) returns the image agent i has of agent h according to agent g.
Said differently, it returns what g thinks i thinks of h.
As introduced in Section 4, every agent bases its decision-making on the im-
age it believes all agents to have of each other, as well as each agent’s behavioral
habits. Let g be an agent, whose image at time t is Imgg, and action distribution
is ADg. At time t + 1, these constructs are updated via the image estimation
function IE and action distribution estimation function ADE respectively, to
produce Img′g and AD
′
g.
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5.1 Image and Reputation
This subsection builds towards the formal definition of the image estimation
function IE. To this end, we introduce the notion of expected total impact. Con-
sider two agents h and i. In any given state, agent h can perform one of several
actions which may or may not have an impact on agent i. Likewise, agent i can be
expected to have an impact on agent h when performing an action. The expected
total impact should be thought of as a way of assigning a numerical value to the
bidirectional impact these two agents can be expected to have on each other.
Additionally, one direction of the impact may be perceived as more important
than the other and thus be weighed differently. According to an observing agent,
say g, the total impact h is expected to have on, as well as perceive from, i when
the environment is in state s, is defined as
ETIg(h, i, s, ADg) :=
∑
a∈A
[
δADg(i, s)(a)I(h, i, s, a)
+(1− δ)ADg(h, s)(a)I(i, h, s, a)
]
,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] weighs the importance of impact due to agent h and impact
perceived by h.
Agent g’s image of other agents, as well as the image it believes all agents
to have of each other changes as it observes the agents’ behavior. Let Imgg
be the current image function of agent g. The updated image function Img′g is
computed as follows:
Img′g := IE(g, Imgg, α, s, ADg)
:=
{
(h, i, t)
∣∣∣ h, i ∈ G ∧ t = U(Imgg(h, i), ETIg(h, i, s, ADg))},
where s is the current state of the environment, IE is called the image estimation
function, and U is the image update function.
Finally, the notion of reputation as it is understood in this framework can be
thought of as a way of summarizing the information encapsulated by the image.
Formally, the reputation of an agent h, according to agent g, is defined as
REPg(h, Imgg) :=
1
|G′|
∑
i∈G′
Imgg(h, i)× Imgg(i, g),
where Imgg(i, i) = 1 ∀i ∈ G, and G′ = G if h 6= g and G′ = G \ {g} if h = g.
Recall that in the RepNet framework, reputation influences subjective transition
probabilities, which, in turn, influence a RepNet agent’s planning.
5.2 Subjective actions and the subjective transition model
In this section, we describe the use of subjective actions and subjective transition
models in the RepNet framework. As introduced in Section 4, we make a distinc-
tion between the purpose of an objective transition model, which describes the
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actual rules of the environment as they apply to the RepNet agent, and that of a
subjective transition model, which describes that agent’s subjective perception of
the rules of the environment, this perception being influenced by the reputation
of the RepNet agent. To illustrate this further, we will make use of a simple
trading example between two agents A and B. Agent A wishes to trade with
agent B, who can either accept or refuse the trade offer. The environment is
made up of the set of states
S = {s0, s1, sa, sr}.
s0 is the initial state, prior to any trade, s1 is the state in which agent B is made
aware of agent A’s trade offer, sa is the accept state, and sr is the refuse state.
The set of objective actions at the disposal of both agents is given by
Ao = {trade with A, trade with B, accept, refuse, wait}.
The transition model of the environment assumed to be deterministic, is given in
Fig. 2. In the eyes of agent A, agent B’s response to a trade offer, characterized
s0 s1
sa
sr
trade with B, wait
wait, accept
wait, refuse
1
1
1
Fig. 2: Transition model of the environment (trading example). Each transition
has two objective actions, the first action represents agent A’s objective action,
the second action represents agent B’s objective action.
by transitions s1 → sa and s1 → sr, depends on A’s reputation. The action
taken by agent A during these transitions is wait. To make use of the notion of
subjective actions, the set of subjective actions As will contain the counterpart5
of wait in its subjective form, that is,
As = {wait s}.
The way agent A makes use of actions in Ao and As can now be detailed.
When planning to maximize its expected impact, agent A will make use of
the objective transition model whenever the action currently investigated has
5 We define counterpart as a partial mapping C : Ao → As. If C(a) is not defined, then
a has no counterpart in As.
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no subjective counterpart in As. For instance, the transition probability when
investigating action trade with B is given by
OT (A, s0, trade with B, s1).
When an action in Ao has a counterpart in As, agent A will make use of the
subjective transition model. For instance, the transition probability when inves-
tigating action wait/wait s is given by
STA(A, s1, wait s, sa, rA).
As such, the reputation of agent A is accounted for when agent A plans to
maximize its expected impact.
5.3 Action distribution
The next step in the formalization of RepNet-MDPs consists in redefining the
updating scheme of the action distribution ADg of each agent g. Say an envi-
ronment hosting two agents g and h is currently in state s. Agent g has an a
priori notion of the probability of agent h picking an action a in state s,
Pg(a|h, s, rh).
Following agent h performing action a in this state, the environment transitions
from state s to state s′. The a posteriori probability of agent h performing that
same action a in state s in the future is now computed using Bayes’ rule6:
Pg(a|h, s, rh, s′) = Pg(s
′|h, s, rh, a)Pg(a|h, s, rh)
Pg(s′|h, s, rh)
=
Pg(s
′|h, s, rh, a)Pg(a|h, s)∑
a′ Pg(s
′|h, s, rh, a′)Pg(a′|h, s) .
The probabilities may now be replaced by the RepNet nomenclature:
AD′g(h, s)(a) =
Tg(h, s, a, s
′, rh)ADg(h, s)(a)∑
a′ Tg(h, s, a
′, s′, rh)ADg(h, s)(a′)
.
One can add smoothing smoothing to the present result in an effort to avoid
undesirable side effects of using a deterministic transition model. Consider the
trading scenario between agents A and B described in Section 5.2. The transitions
of the environment are assumed to be deterministic, that is
UT (B, s1, accept, a) = 1, UT (B, s1, refuse, r) = 1.
If agent B refuses the trade offer made by agent A, the environment transitions
to state r and the action distribution is updated as follows:
6 Bayes’ theorem is defined mathematically as follows: P (A|B,C) = P (B|A,C)P (A|C)
P (B|C) ,
where A, B and C are events and P (B|C) 6= 0.
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AD′A(B, s1)(accept) =
UT (B, s1, accept, r)ADA(B, s1)(accept)∑
a′ UT (B, s1, a
′, r)ADA(B, s1)(a′)
=
0 ·ADA(B, s1)(accept)∑
a′ UT (B, s1, a
′, r)ADA(B, s1)(a′)
= 0
AD′A(B, s1)(refuse) =
UT (B, s1, refuse, r)ADA(B, s1)(refuse)∑
a′ UT (B, s1, a
′, r)ADA(B, s1)(a′)
=
1 ·ADA(B, s1)(refuse)∑
a′ UT (B, s1, a
′, r)ADA(B, s1)(a′)
= 1
As such, agent A is, in the wake of a single unsuccessful trade, now convinced
that agent B will never accept any trade offer in the future. Moreover, it is now
impossible for agent A to change its strategy in the future. In fact, the probability
of B accepting a trade is 0, and regardless of what this value is multiplied by in
the future, it will always remain 0.
This inconvenience is addressed by applying a smoothing technique called
Laplace smoothing [9]. The smoothing technique prevents probabilities of 0 from
ever occurring, and can be applied to the action distribution update function,
resulting in the following definition for the action distribution estimation:
AD′g := ADE(g, s
′, ADg, Imgg)
:=
{
(h, s, a, p)
∣∣∣∣∣ h ∈ G ∧ s ∈ S ∧ a ∈ A ∧ rh = REPg(h, Imgg)
∧ p = Tg(h, s, a, s
′, rh)ADg(h, s)(a) + η∑
a′(Tg(h, s, a
′, s′, rh)ADg(h, s)(a′) + η)
}
,
where ADE is called the action distribution estimation function, s′ is the state
the environment transitions to, and η is the Laplace smoothing parameter.
Note that to simplify the notation, we combined the objective and subjective
transition models into a single model Tg, called the global transition model and
formally defined as
Tg(h, s, ah, s
′, rh) :=
{
STg(h, s, ah, s
′, rh) if ah ∈ As
OT (h, s, ah, s
′) if ah ∈ Ao
(1)
6 Planning in the RepNet framework
We now describe optimal behavior in the context of RepNet-MDPs, for finite
horizon look-ahead. To simplify the notation, we can define a construct called
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epistemic state. The epistemic state θg of agent g is formally defined as a tuple
θg :=
〈
s,ADg, Imgg
〉
,
where s is the current state of the environment, ADg is the current action distri-
bution of agent g, and Imgg is the current image function of agent g. θg ∈ Θg,
and Θg is called the epistemic state space. This set contains every possible com-
bination of physical states of the environment, action distributions, and image
functions of agent g.
An agent should perform actions according to the perceived immediate im-
pact they have on the agent itself. The perceived immediate impact on agent g
resulting from performing action a in state s is defined as
PIg(s,ADg, a) :=
1
|G|
[ I(g, g, s, a) + ∑
h∈G\{g}
∑
a′∈A
I(g, h, s, a′)ADg(h, s)(a′)
]
,
where ADg is the current action distribution of agent g. The first term describes
the immediate self-impact as a consequence of agent g performing action a, while
the second term describes the expected immediate impact that the network (i.e.,
the remaining agents) has on agent g.
Analogously to regular MDPs, a RepNet-MDP agent g strives to maximize
its expected discounted perceived impact
E
[ k∑
t=0
γtPIg,t
]
,
where γ is the discount factor and PIg,t is agent g’s perceived immediate impact
at time-step t. This is accomplished by computing the optimal value function
Vg : Θg×N→ R (in a finite-horizon setting). It satisfies the optimality equations,
which are defined as (∀θg ∈ Θg)
Vg(θg, k) := max
a∈A
{
PIg(s,ADg, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
Tg(g, s, a, s
′, rg)Vg(θ′g, k − 1)
}
Vg(θg, 1) := max
a∈A
{
PIg(s,ADg, a)
} (2)
where rg = REPg(g, Imgg), θg =
〈
s,ADg, Imgg
〉
, and
θ′g =
〈
s′, ADE(g, s′, ADg, Imgg), IE(g, Imgg, α, s, ADg)
〉
.
The optimal action for agent g, written pi(θg, k), is defined as
pi(θg, k) := arg max
a∈A
{
PIg(s,ADg, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
Tg(g, s, a, s
′, rg)Vg(θ′g, k − 1)
}
.
In this work, we implement (approximate) online planning [12] instead of
exact planning. The general principle of model-based online planning can be
described as the interleaving of two phases, the planning phase, in which the
(PO)MDP performs a look-ahead search of a given depth D, starting at the
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current environment state, the goal being to determine the most suitable action,
and the execution phase, in which this action is applied to the environment
[12]. The description of online planning applied to the RepNet-MDP framework
follows hereafter.
Let g be an agent deployed in an environment that can be in two physical
states s0 or s1. The set of possible actions A comprises actions a0 and a1, and
the environment is currently in state s0. Agent g has current action distribution
AD0g and image function Img
0
g . The physical state of the environment, action
distribution, and image function can be combined to form an epistemic state
θ0g = 〈s0, AD0g , Img0g〉.
The RepNet agent can construct a look-ahead tree of depth D starting at
the current epistemic state. Fig. 3 depicts a search space of depth D = 1. Every
action in A first leads to the formation of a new branch, at the end of which is
an AND-node (or action node) with the corresponding action. From each AND-
node, every physical state is a potential future state and requires the formation
of a new branch at the end of which is an OR-node (or epistemic state node) that
contains the corresponding epistemic state. Consider the epistemic state in the
lower-left corner of Fig. 3, i.e. 〈s0, AD1g , Img1g〉. AD1g and Img1g are obtained by
updating the previous action distribution AD0g and the previous image function
Img0g , using the new physical state s0.
〈s0, AD0g , Img0g〉
a0
〈s0, AD1g , Img1g〉 〈s1, AD2g , Img2g〉
a1
〈s0, AD1g , Img1g〉 〈s1, AD2g , Img2g〉
Fig. 3: Look-ahead search space, depth D = 1 (RepNet-MDP)
After constructing the search space, an estimation of the value function needs
to be back-propagated from the leaves to the root of the tree. A heuristic estimate
of the true value function
h : Θg → R
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can be computed at the leaves by taking the base case of the Bellman equations
for RepNet-MDPs:
h(θg) = max
a∈A
{
PIg(s,ADg, a)
}
.
The epistemic state-action values are then computed at the action nodes as
follows:
q(θg, a) = PIg(s,ADg, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
Tg(g, s, a, s
′, rg)h(θ′g).
Non-leaf state nodes use the maximum of the epistemic state-action values of
their children as their estimate of the value function, i.e.
h(θg) = max
a∈A
{
q(θg, a)
}
.
7 Experiments
The goal of the experiments is to showcase the strengths and shortcomings of the
framework. To this end, the experimental setup consists of 2 trading scenarios,
for which several experiments are conducted. All experiments were conducted
with look-ahead depth D = 3, Laplace smoothing parameter η = 0.1, and discount
factor γ = 0.7.
7.1 Experiment 1: Trading between two agents
Let A and B be two agents. Agent A plays the role of the buyer, agent B the role
of the seller. Agent A can engage in a trade with agent B, and B can accept or
refuse the trade offer. Furthermore, agent A can, prior to making a trade offer,
do a good deed in an effort to improve its image in the eyes of agent B.
In this series of experiments, Agent A is managed by the RepNet algorithm.
Agent B is run by a simple algorithm that accepts or rejects trade offers made by
agent A according to a set schedule. In particular, agent B is asked to reject trade
offers for the 20 first time-steps, accept them for the 60 subsequent time-steps,
and finally reject them for the last 20 time-steps.
Two series of experiments are conducted, the first one without making use
of subjective actions, the second one by modeling the action of agent A awaiting
agent B’s response to a trade offer as a subjective action, meaning the outcome
of agent A’s planning will be influenced by its reputation. A well-designed sub-
jective transition model, schematized in Fig. 4, that realistically reflects how the
reputation of agent A may influence the willingness of agent B to accept A’s
trade offers is put to the test. The variables tracked are the action distribution,
image, and by extension the reputation of both agents in the eyes of agent A,
and frequency at which agent A makes trade offers.
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of agent A’s action distribution for target agent
B. Fig. 6 shows the evolution of agent A’s self-reputation during the experiment
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Fig. 4: Perceived probability of agent B accepting and refusing the trade offers,
as a function of the self-reputation of agent A.
involving the subjective transition model. Note that A’s self-reputation, and
more generally A’s image function, have no bearing on its decision-making if no
subjective actions are used (see Equations 1 and 2, Tg makes use of the notion
of reputation only for subjective actions). Finally, Fig. 7 shows the evolution of
the frequency at which A makes trade offers.
In the first 20 time-steps, B refuses each trade offer. Regardless of the series
of experiments, agent A is able to pick up on this via the action distribution. As
a consequence, it quickly reduces the frequency at which it attempts to trade
with B. In the 60 following time-steps, B is asked to change its behavior and
accept each trade offer. Hesitant at first, A gradually increases the frequency at
which it attempts to trade with B. Agent A is able to pick up on B reverting
back to its old behavior during the final 20 steps.
Additionally making use of a well-designed subjective transition model no-
ticeably improves the RepNet agent’s performance. While the trajectories show-
case the same key elements, the pace at which agent A is able to adapt improves
greatly. The subjective transition model was designed such that agent A be-
lieves that its reputation must be good for B to be willing to trade with A (Fig.
4). As such, during the first 20 time-steps, A’s relatively poor-in-comparison
self-reputation has an immediate negative effect on the value it associates with
the trade with B action during the look-ahead search. It quickly becomes more
valuable to stop trading with B. Similarly, A’s reputation needs to be high for
it to start trading with B again, explaining the slow increase of the frequency of
trade offers at the start of the second phase.
7.2 Experiment 2: Trading between three agents
Let A, B, and C be three agents. Each agent simultaneously plays the role of
buyer and seller, and can thus engage in a trade with any other agent. Each
agent can accept or refuse any trade offer made by any remaining agent.
The present scenario is used to verify the ability of a RepNet agent, say agent
A, to manage its trades with the two remaining agents B and C, based not only
on their behavior towards the agent of interest but also their behavior with each
other.
In the first part, agent B is asked to refuse each trade offer made by agent
A, while agent C is expected to accept each trade offer coming from A. This
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Fig. 5: Probability of B accepting A’s trade offers, according to A
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Fig. 7: Frequency of the trade offers made by A, measured in 5 time-step intervals
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portion of the experiments assesses the ability of the RepNet agent (agent A) to
accurately determine which agent it is more likely to successfully engage in trades
with. In the second part, the roles are switched, and agent B accepts the trade
offers, while agent C refuses them. This portion assesses the ability of the agent
of interest to unlearn what it has learned and adapt its behavior accordingly. In
the third and final part, the RepNet agent is asked to not trade with either B
or C, that is, to only make use of the wait action. Said differently, the optimal
action according to its planning, while tracked throughout the experiment, is
not performed on the environment. All the while, agents B and C are asked to
engage in trades with each other. Agent B is asked to reject all trade offers,
while agent C is asked to accept all trade offers. The variables tracked are the
action distribution and reputation of B and C in the eyes of agent A, as well
as the evolution of whom agent A would rather trade with. This portion of the
experiment aims at testing the ability of the RepNet agent to draw conclusions
on how it should act based on interactions it is not directly affected by.
Fig. 8 shows the evolution of the reputations of agents B and C. Fig. 9
displays the evolution of the probabilities of agents B and C accepting trade
offers from agent A. Finally, Fig. 10 shows the evolution of whom agent A would
rather trade with.
Agent B is told to refuse, and agent C to accept, each trade offer during
the first 33 time-steps. In accordance with the results obtained in Section 7.1,
agent A is able to pick up on the other agents’ behavioral habits it is affected
by. As a result, the reputation of B and its probability of accepting trade offers
decrease. Similarly, the reputation of C and its probability of accepting trade
offers increase. All the while, agent A chooses to conduct the majority of its
trades with C. The following 33 time-steps reverse B’s and C’s roles. Similarly,
agent A is able to adapt its behavior accordingly and ends up trading mostly with
B. The reputation of B has increased, while the reputation of C has decreased.
During the last 33 time-steps, agents B and C are tasked with trading with
one another while A plays the role of observer, that is, only makes use of the
wait action. B is asked to refuse all trade offers, while C is asked to accept all
trade offers. Interestingly, Fig. 10 shows that, based on its planning, agent A
would prefer to keep trading with B, even though the reputation of B decreases
and the reputation of C increases in the eyes of A. Said differently, as long as B
does not refuse A’s offers directly, agent A will prefer to trade with B over C.
The explanation for this is twofold. Firstly, the subjective transition proba-
bility of a trade A might want to do with B is, in the eyes of A, conditioned only
by A’s own reputation. As such, B’s falling or rising reputation has no bearing
on A’s decision-making. Secondly, the probability of B accepting (or refusing)
A’s trade offer, according to A, can only be updated through the direct expe-
rience it has with B. As such, the action distribution does not change and can
thus not influence A decision-making either.
The simplest way of alleviating this shortcoming is to extend the subjective
transition model. Adding the reputation of the agent at the receiving end of
the trade offer (e.g., agent B) as a parameter to the subjective transition model
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would allow agent A to incorporate other agents’ reputation in its decision-
making process. As such, if the subjective transition probability of B accepting
A’s trade offer were given by
STA(A, offer state, wait s, accept state, rA, rB),
where the newly introduced parameter rB is B’s reputation, agent A could make
use of rB to assist with its decision-making. This comes with the drawback of
increasing the complexity of designing the subjective transition model.
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Fig. 8: Reputation of agents B and C, according to A
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Fig. 9: Probability of agents B and C accepting trade offers from agent A, ac-
cording to A
8 Summary and future work
In this paper, we revised the multi-agent framework called RepNet introduced
by Rens et al. [11], addressed its mathematical inconsistencies and proposed a
online learning algorithm for finding approximate solutions. The viability of the
framework was then tested in a series of experiments.
The current definition of objective transitions could be extended to incorpo-
rate the reputation of agents other than the RepNet agent. The experimental
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Fig. 10: Average action taken by agent A. Action a = 0 corresponds to trading
with agent B, action a = 1 corresponds to trading with agent C.
results showed that the RepNet agent is incapable of adapting its behavior to
situations that do not directly affect it. Including the reputation of the agent at
the receiving end of a directed action in the directed transition model is likely
to lead to better-informed decision-making.
We did not address partially observable environments. Many real-world prob-
lems do not benefit from full observability, bringing the updated RepNet frame-
work back to a partially observable setting should be considered for future work.
Real-world problems can easily become too complex for transition models
to be designed by any one person without leveraging common state features
[5]. A compact way to represent real-world state spaces can be achieved by
introducing elements of relational logic [5]. From a logic programming point of
view, a state space is hereby defined by a collection of relations, while a state
is an interpretation of this collection [8]. Transition models and reward schemes
are then represented by probabilistic rules [10].
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